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In race and sex discrimination class actions, if a defendant
employer makes a Rule 68 offer of judgment to the named plaintiffs,
courts routinely refuse to dismiss the class claims. In stark contrast,
in collective actions for failure to pay lawful wages, if a defendant
employer makes a Rule 68 offer of judgment, courts will often
dismiss the entire collective action as having been mooted by the
named plaintiffs' recovery. The outcome of such a dichotomy is that
low-wage workers are increasingly unable to challenge unlawful
wage violations successfully because the aggregation mechanism is
too easily defeated. Without an ability to group wage and hour
claims in an aggregate action, multitudes of wage violations will go
unheard because individual wage claims do not attract the attention
of plaintiffs' attorneys.
This failure to protect an underprivileged group of low-wage
workers-workers the laws explicitly try to protect-is striking, and
it effectively subverts the statutory protections in place since the
1930s to combat wage theft by employers. By most accounts, the civil
rights movement of the 1960s was successful in addressing
discriminatory practices through not only substantive statutory
rights, but also through procedural mechanisms by which those
rights could be vindicated easily and appropriately via access to the
courts.
In contrast, the right of low-wage workers to receive what
they lawfully earn has a longstanding statutory remedy but an
antiquated procedural mechanism. That procedural mechanism
diminishes their ability to fully vindicate their rights. Furthermore,
it is also now being cited as the structural difference that allows
another procedural rule, Rule 68, to deny standing in federal court
at the outset.
This Article examines this rising phenomenon by first
outlining the pressing societal need for collective litigation to ensure
that adequate and available legal remedies remain for
underrepresented groups such as low-wage workers. It also compares
the procedural mechanisms for bringing aggregate litigation-Rule
23 class actions and § 216(b) collective actions-and examines how
Rule 68 has both intended and unintended consequences when used
by defendants to battle collective actions. Lastly, the Article
identifies how federal courts have treated Rule 68 offers of judgment
inconsistently in the class action context compared to the § 216(b)
collective action context.
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INTRODUCTION
If the rising number of lawsuits against major corporate
employers is any indication, the United States is suffering a crisis of
wage theft against its workers. Claims by workers that they are not
being paid lawfully have quadrupled over the last ten years-
increasing by 73 percent from 2006 to 2007 alone'-without any
corresponding increase in protections in the wage and hour laws.
What has changed? Perhaps employers with dwindling revenues are
taking the bite out of the backs of their workers. Or perhaps plaintiffs'
attorneys are becoming increasingly savvy at bringing these suits
successfully. Either way, management attorneys are becoming
correspondingly creative in finding ways to block them-including use
of a tactic that this Article identifies as troubling.
1. JAMES C. DUFF, ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED
STATES COURTS: 2007 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 150 tbl.C-2A (2007), available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2007/contents.html (noting that there were 4,207 claims under
the Fair Labor Standards Act in 2006, and that the number rose to 7,310 in 2007).
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Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68 ("Rule 68") offers of
judgment are being used with increased frequency by employers
attempting to avoid liability for wage theft in cases involving
numerous plaintiffs. When defendants make offers of judgment that
equal or exceed the named plaintiffs' maximum recovery in collective
actions brought under the opt-in provision of 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (for
violations of the wage rights provisions of the Fair Labor Standards
Act ("FLSA")),2 courts frequently rule the collective claims moot and
dismiss the collective suit. By making early offers of judgment in
collective actions,3 employers seek to "pick off" named plaintiffs and
thereby avoid compensating all of the workers to whom they have
failed to pay correct wages.
By contrast, the courts have not allowed this same Rule 68
tactic similarly to preempt Rule 23 class actions. Indeed, courts have
historically been critical of defendants attempting to use Rule 68 to
avoid liability in Rule 23 class actions, such as those brought under
Title VII, because such attempts "would frustrate the objectives of
class actions."4 Perhaps because Title VII class actions and Rule 23
have a more celebrated statutory history within the civil rights
tradition,5 these types of suits have received judicial protection from
Rule 68 abuses.6
2. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (2010).
3. "Collective actions" refer to suits utilizing the collective mechanism for grouping
multiple similar claims in one lawsuit, under 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), as distinct from class actions
brought under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. Section 216(b) lawsuits include violations
under the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219, the Equal Pay Act ("EPA"),
29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (2006), and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. §§
621-634 (2006). Under each of these federal statutes, a Rule 23 class action is not permitted.
Instead, these statutes require that all employees covered by the class definition opt in to the
lawsuit by giving written consent to join the class within the opt-in period. See 29 U.S.C. § 216(b)
("No employee shall be a party plaintiff to any such action unless he gives his consent in writing
to become such a party and such consent is filed in the court in which such action is brought.").
4. Deposit Guar. Nat'l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 339 (1980); see also Weiss v. Regal
Collections, 385 F.3d 337, 342 (3d Cir. 2004) (considering and rejecting the defendant's claim
that a Rule 68 offer of settlement to the named plaintiff in a class action mooted the entire
action); Morgan v. Account Collection Tech., L.L.C., No. 05-CV-2131 (KMK), 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 64528, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 29, 2006) ("[W]hen a class has been certified, mootness of
the named plaintiffs personal claim does not render the entire controversy moot."). But see Davis
v. Ball Mem'l Hosp. Ass'n, 753 F.2d 1410, 1416-17, 1420 (7th Cir. 1985) (affirming a
decertification of the plaintiff class after a settlement between one of the defendants and the
class representative plaintiffs and dismissing the claim as moot).
5. For a discussion of the civil rights history of Rule 23 and Title VII class actions, see
Nantiya Ruan, Bringing Sense to Incentives: An Examination of Incentive Payments to Named
Plaintiffs in Employment Discrimination Class Actions, 10 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 395, 400-
04 (2006).
6. See Deposit Guar. Nat? Bank, 445 U.S. at 339 (discussing the policy against finding
mootness in the context of a Rule 68 offer to settle to the class representative); Hennessey v.
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This Article examines this rising phenomenon first by outlining
in Part I the pressing societal need for collective litigation to ensure
that adequate and available legal remedies remain for
underrepresented groups, such as low-wage workers. Part II compares
the procedural mechanisms for bringing aggregate litigation-Rule 23
class actions and § 216(b) collective actions-and examines how Rule
68 has both intended and unintended consequences when used by
defendants to battle collective actions. Part III identifies the
inconsistencies apparent in the federal case law, which denies the
applicability of Rule 68 in the class context but often dismisses
collective claims when Rule 68 offers are made to collective action
plaintiffs. Lastly, Part IV makes the argument that Rule 68 offers are
intrinsically incompatible with both class and collective actions
because of its automatic function, which subverts judicial oversight of
aggregate litigation.
I. COLLECTIVE LITIGATION UNDER SECTION 216(b): ENSURING
WORKERS' ABILITY To REMEDY WAGE THEFT
The mechanism for collective action under § 216(b) provides an
avenue of redress to a large group of underprivileged and
underrepresented people and has been utilized widely in furthering
the rights of minority and low-wage workers. Congress has
acknowledged the important societal role these statutory protections
provide and has created incentives to encourage private enforcement
of public goods through statutory fees, shifting costs, and statutory
penalties. For example, the statutory regime relies upon plaintiffs'
attorneys to act as "private attorneys general" to vindicate important
societal interests by allowing one-way fee-shifting in order to
encourage prosecution of these rights.7
A. FLSA Collective Actions: A Brief History
Roughly seven decades after enactment, "the Fair Labor
Standards Act remains the primary federal statute setting the
Conn. Valley Fitness Ctrs., Inc., No. CV980504488S, 2001 WL 1199840, at *5 (Conn. Super. Ct.
Sept. 12, 2001) (same).
7. See, e.g., Fortner Enters. v. U.S. Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 502 (1969) ("As the special
provision awarding treble damages to successful plaintiffs illustrates, Congress has encouraged
private antitrust litigation not merely to compensate those who have been directly injured but
also to vindicate the important public interest in free competition."); Newman v. Piggie Park
Enters., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968) (per curiam) ("[A plaintiff suing under Title II of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964] does so not for himself alone but also as a 'private attorney general,'
vindicating a policy that Congress considered of the highest priority.").
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minimum wage and maximum hour standards applicable to most
American workers."8 Congress enacted the sweeping legislation in
1938 to address substandard labor conditions, finding after numerous
hearings that the unregulated and detrimental labor conditions
prevalent at the time negatively affected the "health, efficiency and
general well-being" of workers.9
With an aim of rectifying these labor conditions, the FLSA, in
addition to certain exemptions and enforcement provisions, includes
provisions: (1) setting a minimum wage,10 (2) requiring premium
overtime pay for work exceeding forty hours per week," (3) prohibiting
child labor,12 and (4) requiring employers to keep accurate time
records.'3 To ensure that these rights are vindicated, the FLSA
authorizes both the Department of Labor and private parties to sue in
federal court to recover damages.14
Congress explicitly granted employees the right to recover for
multiple similarly situated workers in the same FLSA lawsuit.15
These "collective actions" utilize the 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) mechanism for
grouping multiple similar claims in one lawsuit. Section 216(b) also
permitted employees to designate a completely uninterested third
party, such as a labor union that itself suffered no overtime injury, to
bring and maintain the employees' overtime suit. What followed was a
significant increase of representative suits filed by parties with no
personal stake in the outcome.' 6 Such fishing expeditions were costly
8. Scott Miller, Revitalizing the FLSA, 19 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 1, 25 (2001) (quoting
HEALTH, EDUC., & HUMAN SERV. Div., GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO THE SUBCOMMITTEE
ON WORKFORCE PROTECTIONS, COMMITTEE ON EDUCATION AND THE WORKFORCE, U.S. HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT: WHITE-COLLAR EXEMPTIONS IN THE MODERN
WORK PLACE 1 (1999) (GAO/HEHS-99-164) (urging the United States Department of Labor to
revise the white-collar tests)).
9. Carol Abdelmesseh & Deanne M. DiBlasi, Why Punitive Damages Should Be Awarded
For Retaliatory Discharge Under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 21 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J.
715, 719 (2004) (quoting ABA SEC. OF LAB. & EMP. LAW, THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT 13
(Ellen C. Kearns et al. eds., 1999) (discussing the legislative history of the Act)).
10. 29 U.S.C. § 206 (2006).
11. Id. § 207(a)(1).
12. Id. § 212.
13. Id. § 211(c).
14. Id. § 216(b).
15. Id.
16. See Hoffmann-La Roche Inc. v. Sperling, 493 U.S. 165, 173 (1989) (noting the "excessive
litigation spawned by plaintiffs lacking a personal interest in the outcome" in the context of a
discussion of Congress's later amendments to the FLSA in the Portal-to-Portal Act); Cameron-
Grant v. Maxim Healthcare Servs., Inc., 347 F.3d 1240, 1248 (11th Cir. 2003) ("In 1947,
Congress enacted the Portal to Portal Act 'in response to a "national emergency" created by a
flood of suits under the FLSA aimed at collecting portal-to-portal pay allegedly due employees.'"
(quoting Arrington v. Nat'l Broad. Co., 531 F. Supp. 498, 500 (D.D.C. 1982))); United Food &
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to employers because they had to respond to numerous complaints and
discovery requests from parties without a cognizable claim of their
own.17
Congress reacted by limiting private FLSA plaintiffs to
employees who asserted claims in their own right.18 Specifically,
Congress amended the FLSA to change the representative procedure
in the 1947 Portal-to-Portal Act ("PPA").19 The PPA did not alter the
right of employees to bring representative suits on behalf of others
similarly situated. Rather, it simply prevented employees from
designating uninterested third parties (i.e., "representatives") to bring
the suit on their behalf.20
In addition, while leaving intact the similarly situated
language providing for collective actions, Congress required workers
who wished to participate to affirmatively opt in by filing a written
consent to join.21 Importantly, opt-in actions were, at the time, a well-
established vehicle for representative actions under the then-current
version of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. Commonly referred to as
Commercial Workers Union, Local 1564 v. Albertson's, Inc., 207 F.3d 1193, 1200 (10th Cir. 2000)
(noting that the Portal-to-Portal Act amendment targeted the "fear that unions, as
representatives, were concretely benefitting from participation in" FLSA actions (quoting
Arrington, 531 F. Supp. at 502 n.8)).
17. James M. Fraser, Note, Opt-in Class Actions Under the FLSA, EPA, and ADEA: What
Does it Mean to be "Similarly Situated"?, 38 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 95, 98 (2004) (referring to such
claims as "blackmail" suits).
18. On this point, Senator Donnell, then Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee,
made the following remarks before Congress:
It will be observed, Mr. President, that two types of action are permitted
under this [then-current] sentence in section 16(b) of the [FLSA]: First, a suit
by one or more employees, for himself and all other employees similarly
situated. That I shall call for the purpose of identification a collective action .
... The second class of actions . . . embrace those in which an agent or a
representative who may not be an employee of the company at all can be
designated by the employee or employees to maintain an action on behalf of
all employees similarly situated.. . . In the first case, an employee, a man who
is working for the X steel company can sue for himself and other employees.
We see no objection to that. But the second class of cases, namely, cases in
which an outsider, perhaps someone who is desirous of stirring up litigation
without being an employee at all, is permitted to be the plaintiff in the case,
may result in very decidedly unwholesome champertous situations which we
think should not be permitted under the law.
93 Cong. Rec. 2182 (1947) (emphasis added), quoted in Arrington, 531 F. Supp. at 501.
19. Pub. L. No. 80-49, § 5(a), 61 Stat. 84, 87 (1947) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §
216(b)).
20. Hoffmann-La Roche Inc., 493 U.S. at 173 ("[T]he representative action by plaintiffs not
themselves possessing claims was abolished, and the requirement that an employee file a written
consent was added.").
21. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b).
732 [Vol. 63:3:727
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spurious class actions,22 these actions required individuals to opt in to
be bound by a class action judgment. 23 The addition of the opt-in
requirement to § 216(b) thus simply codified the common practice of
treating aggregate claims as spurious class actions.24
B. Rule 23 Class Actions vs. Section 216(b) Collective Actions: A
Procedural Matter That Has Made All the Difference
Two decades after the FLSA amendments, the Civil Rights Act
and corresponding litigation moved to the forefront of the legal scene.
The creation of new statutory rights led advocates to push for an
aggregate plaintiffs' vehicle that would support the movement. 25 The
result was the current version of Rule 23, which replaced the spurious
22. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee's note, 1966 amends. (defining spurious class
actions to include suits "involving 'several' rights affected by a common question and related to
common relief'); 8 ALBA CONTE & HERBERT B. NEWBERG, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 24:3
(4th ed. 2002) ("This statutory class action [§ 216(b)] resembles the permissive intervention type
of spurious class action under former Rule 23."); Fraser, supra note 17, at 102 (discussing
spurious class actions); Brian R. Gates, Note, A "Less Stringent" Standard? How to Give FLSA
Section 16(b) a Life of Its Own, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1519, 1545 (2005) ("[Alfter Congress
enacted the Portal-to-Portal Act in 1947, section 16(b) and Rule 23 were alike in their common
use of an 'opt-in' procedure that came to be known as a 'spurious' class action device. . . .
[S]ection 16(b) and Rule 23 possessed a nearly identical mechanism to create a representative
group of plaintiffs.").
23. See 7A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL
PRACTICE & PROCEDURE: CIVIL § 1752 (3d ed. 2005) (discussing generally the nature of spurious
class actions, including the joinder procedure); see also Am. Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S.
538, 549-50 (1974) (noting that, when construing rules of timeliness for joining in spurious class
actions, the majority of courts emphasized and were guided by the "representative nature" of
such class actions in their decisions to relax the rules of timeliness); Escott v. Barchris Constr.
Corp., 340 F.2d 731, 733 (2d Cir. 1965) (emphasizing the "representative character" of a spurious
class action); Nat'l Hairdressers' & Cosmetologists' Ass'n v. Philad Co., 34 F. Supp. 264, 266 (D.
Del. 1940) (recognizing the propriety of such a spurious class action).
24. Fraser, supra note 17, at 100-01; see, e.g., Pentland v. Dravo Corp., 152 F.2d 851, 853-
56 (3d Cir. 1945) (analyzing how courts treated § 216(b) group actions prior to the 1947
amendments and treating the claim as a spurious class action); Barrett v. Nat'l Malleable &
Steel Castings Co., 68 F. Supp. 410, 416 (W.D. Pa. 1946) (treating an aggregate claim as a
spurious class action); Fink v. Oliver Iron Mining Co., 65 F. Supp. 316, 317-18 (D. Minn. 1941)
(same); see also WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note 23, § 1752, at 33 ("The 'spurious' class
action was used extensively in Fair Labor Standards Act litigation . . . .").
25. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2) advisory committee's note, 1966 amends. (stating that the
primary cases that fall within this Rule are "various actions in the civil-rights field where a
party is charged with discriminating unlawfully against a class, usually one whose members are
incapable of specific enumeration"); James E. Pfander, Brown II: Ordinary Remedies for
Extraordinary Wrongs, 24 LAW & INEQ. 47, 72 (2006) ("[T]he official account of the rule change
makes clear its desire to foster civil rights litigation."); Rachel Tallon Pickens, Too Many Riches?
Dukes v. Wal-Mart and the Efficacy of Monolithic Class Actions, 83 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 71, 74
(2006) ("Mhe Federal Rules Advisory Committee explicitly noted that broad civil rights cases
are appropriate under Rule 23."); Ruan, supra note 5, at 400-04 (discussing the civil rights
history of Rule 23 class actions).
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class action classification 26 by allowing each person that fit within the
described class to be a class member-and thus, to be bound by the
judgment unless she opted out of the suit.27 This change caused opt-in
collective actions under § 216(b) to have irreconcilable differences
with, and provide fewer rights than, opt-out Rule 23 class actions. 28
Both types of collective actions began with the same general
policy goals: allowing plaintiffs to aggregate their claims to vindicate
important legal rights by minimizing costs, encouraging private
attorneys general to bring these claims, and promoting judicial
economy.29 The fact that § 216(b) was not similarly amended along
with Rule 23 to provide for a more robust aggregation may have
simply been an oversight. Similarly, it may have been a byproduct of
the reality that only Congress can amend § 216(b) even though the
Supreme Court's Advisory Committee drafted the amendment to Rule
23.30
Despite their common beginnings, the two procedural
mechanisms affect important substantive rights in different ways. For
instance, requiring an affirmative action-such as the filing of a
signed document indicating the desire to opt in-causes a lower rate of
participation by those actually affected by the unlawful practice. 31
This negative effect on participation is exacerbated further when the
person must file the document within a restricted time period. One
key difference between Rule 23 and § 216(b) actions is critical to the
inquiry here. If the named plaintiffs lose their personal stake in the
proceedings (e.g., because their claims are deemed moot), a Rule 23
representative still retains a personal stake in obtaining class
26. See Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 844 n.20 (1999) (stating that the Advisory
Committee drafted subdivision (b)(3) "to replace the old spurious class action category").
27. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(B)(v).
28. See LaChapelle v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 513 F.2d 286, 288-89 (5th Cir. 1975) (discussing
this distinction between § 216(b) and Rule 23).
29. Fraser, supra note 17, at 99, 102-03.
30. See id. at 104-05 (discussing possible explanations for the discrepancy between the
amended Rule 23 and § 216(b)).
31. See Andrew C. Brunsden, Hybrid Class Actions, Dual Certification, and Wage Law
Enforcement in the Federal Courts, 29 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 269, 291-301 (2008)
(empirically documenting low participation rates produced by the opt-in rule, analyzing the
reasons for the low participation rates and discussing how these low rates influence the
effectiveness of wage law enforcement); see also Rachel Alexander, Federal Tails and State Puppy
Dogs: Preempting Parallel State Wage Claims to Preserve the Integrity of Federal Group Wage
Actions, 58 AM. U. L. REV. 515, 518 (2009) ("Historically, the FLSA's opt-in mechanism has
limited the size of the FLSA action, with estimates indicating that typically only between fifteen
and thirty percent of potential plaintiff-employees opt-in.").
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certification. 32 In the § 216(b) context, however, the opposite is true: a
§ 216(b) representative has no right to represent other plaintiffs. 33
As described below, this difference becomes critical in the face
of an acknowledged and growing defense tactic: buying off named
plaintiffs to avoid collective litigations. If the named plaintiffs in a §
216(b) collective action cannot represent the interests of absent
members of the class, then § 216(b) named plaintiffs are easy targets
for being picked off.
C. Attempts to Prevent Wage Violations against Low-Wage Workers
and the Subsequent Backlash
There can be little doubt that actions to recover unpaid wages
from employers have increased in recent years. Over 1,600 FLSA suits
were filed in federal court in 1997.34 Ten years later, in 2007, the
number of FLSA suits filed in federal court jumped to 7,310.35 In just
one year, from 2006 to 2007, the number of FLSA cases filed increased
by 73 percent. 36 Interestingly, this increase has not stemmed from a
change in the law: the wage and hour protections have remained
mostly unchanged since the FLSA's birth in 1938. Instead, it could be
due to the increased pressure on businesses to lower costs and
therefore cut (sometimes unlawfully) workers' wages. Likely, a
combination of factors is responsible for the increase, including
economic pressures, the increased number of plaintiffs' lawyers
successfully pressing wage claims, and changing attitudes about
entitlements.
The increasing number of FLSA actions also reflects a new
social movement that seeks to protect the rights of low-wage workers
through vindication of the statutory rights bequeathed to them in the
1930s. Equal protection and substantive due process claims have
generally failed to protect those living below the poverty line on
32. See U.S. Parole Comm'n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 401-02 (1980) (holding that a
named plaintiff who brings a class action challenging the validity of the U.S. Parole
Commission's Parole Release Guidelines could appeal the denial of class certification even after
his claim becomes moot).
33. Vogel v. Am. Kiosk Mgmt., 371 F. Supp. 2d 122, 127 (D. Conn. 2005) (citing LaChapelle
v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 513 F.2d 286, 288 (5th Cir. 1975)).
34. LEONIDAS RALPH MECHAM, ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF
THE UNITED STATES COURTS: 1997 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 133 tbl.C-2A (1997),
available at http://www.uscourts.gov/judicial-business/contents.html.
35. DUFF, supra note 1, at tbl.C2-A.
36. Id.
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economic justice issues.37 As such, the focus of economic rights
advocates has moved away from a constitutional rights agenda and
toward securing the rights afforded by Congress through statute.
This renaissance of wage and hour protections comes on the
heels of the "war on welfare"38 and its subsequent welfare-to-work
policies of the 1980s and 90s. 39 Attention has moved to "disempowered
groups . . . in jobs with lower pay, less job security, and more difficult
and dangerous working conditions."40 Poverty law scholars, such as
Professors Peter Edelman, Joel Handler, Yeheskel Hasenfeld, and
Julie Nice have provided a comprehensive look at the "dissonance
between the rhetoric of supporting work and the reality of denying
work's rewards."41 This new social movement focuses on reforms to
achieve a "living wage." 42
The media has certainly noticed this explosion of private
lawsuits attempting to vindicate statutory wage rights. From a New
York Times article on the multi-state, multi-million dollar Wal-Mart
37. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 4 (1972) (denying equal
protection claim seeking equalization of school funding); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471,
484 (1970) (affirming the application of the rational basis test to a "state regulation in the social
and economic field, not affecting freedoms guaranteed by the Bill of Rights"); William P. Quigley,
The Right to Work and Earn a Living Wage: A Proposed Constitutional Amendment, 2 N.Y. CITY
L. REV. 139, 171 (1998) (citing Peter B. Edelman, The Next Century of Our Constitution:
Rethinking Our Duty to the Poor, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 1 (1987) (noting that scholars have failed to
identify a constitutional right to a subsistence or minimum income)).
38. Julie Nice, Forty Years of Welfare Policy Experimentation: No Acres, No Mule, No
Politics, No Rights, 4 NW. J.L. & Soc. POL'Y 1, 1-2 (2009) (explaining that while the
government's attempt during the 1990s and 2000s to reduce dependence on welfare was
successful, it did not address the need for more livable wages).
39. 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-619 (2000) (including both Temporary Assistance for Needy Families
and Clinton's "Welfare-to-Work" programs).
40. Nice, supra note 38, at 9 (citing TERESA L. AMOTrT & JULIE A. MATTHAEI, RACE, GENDER,
AND WORK: A MULTI-CULTURAL ECONOMIC HISTORY OF WOMEN IN THE UNITED STATES 318
(1996)).
41. Nice, supra note 38, at 4; see JOEL F. HANDLER & YEHESKEL HASENFELD, BLAME
WELFARE, IGNORE POVERTY AND INEQUALITY 6-7 (2007) (arguing that America demonizes
welfare while those who are "playing by the rules" cannot make it because wages in the low-wage
labor market have stagnated); Peter B. Edelman, Changing the Subject: From Welfare to Poverty
to a Living Income, 4 Nw. J.L. & SOC. POL'Y 14 (2009) (providing a historical account of America's
simultaneous rhetoric against welfare and lack of support for higher wages).
42. See, e.g., BARBARA EHRENREICH, NICKEL AND DIMED: ON (NOT) GETTING BY IN AMERICA
213 (2001) (advocating for a living wage, rather than simply the current minimum wage); Peter
B. Edelman, Promoting Family By Promoting Work: The Hole in Martha Fineman's Doughnut, 8
AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 85, 89-91 (2000) (advocating for a living wage, rather than
simply minimum wage); cf. Economic Analysis of the New Orleans Minimum Wage Proposal,
ACORN, July 1999, at 1, available at http://www.acorn.orglindex.php?id=8047 (finding that the
benefits a higher minimum wage would have on families outweighs the cost to the economy of
New Orleans).
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wage and hour class settlement 43 to a front page Business Week cover
story,44 FLSA collective actions are making news.
Widespread wage violations can be seen across industries. As
Kim Bobo writes in her book, Wage Theft in America, "[B]illions of
dollars in wages are being illegally stolen from millions of workers
each and every year."4 5 Workers in construction, 46 garment factorieS,47
nursing homes,48 agriculture, 49 poultry processing,50 and restaurants5 1
have all suffered extensive and systematic wage theft. In some
instances, these workers have successfully recouped the wages
illegally withheld by employers in violation of the FLSA and state
wage and hour laws.
A judicial effort to stymie this influx of complex federal
lawsuits might be at the heart of the inconsistent treatment of Rule 68
offers in aggregate litigation. Finding a category of lawsuits moot is
one expedient remedy for the problem of increased litigation.52
43. Steven Greenhouse & Stephanie Rosenbloom, Wal-Mart Settles 63 Lawsuits Over
Wages, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24, 2008, at BI.
44. Michael Orey, Wage Wars: Workers-From Truck Drivers to Stockbrokers-Are Winning
Huge Overtime Lawsuits, Bus. WK., Oct. 1, 2007, at 50.
45. KIM BOBo, WAGE THEFI IN AMERICA 6 (2009).
46. See, e.g., Strouse v. J. Kinson Cook, Inc., 634 F.2d 883, 886 (5th Cir. 1981) (granting
construction workers' request for attorneys' fees in a breach of FLSA case). Included in this
category are day laborers, who are paid a daily wage and have little recourse if that wage is
denied to them. See Marroquin v. Canales, 236 F.R.D. 257, 262 (D. Md. 2006) (permitting
certification of FLSA class action against employer where day laborers cleaned up debris from
Hurricane Katrina).
47. See, e.g., Zeng Liu v. Donna Karan Int'l, Inc., 207 F. Supp. 2d 191, 193 (S.D.N.Y. 2002)
(denying employer's attempt to counter an FLSA class action brought by Chinese-American
employees).
48. See, e.g., Hamelin v. Faxton-St. Luke's Healthcare, No. 6:08-CV-1210 (DNHIDEP), 2009
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9793, *33--34 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 26, 2009) (permitting class certification for
employees of health care facilities who were allegedly compelled to work during unpaid lunch
breaks).
49. See, e.g., Reich v. Tiller Helicopter Servs., 8 F.3d 1018, 1023-27 (5th Cir. 1993)
(discussing the FLSA's agricultural exemption).
50. See, e.g., Perez v. Mountaire Farms, Inc., 610 F. Supp. 2d 499, 528 (D. Md. 2009)
(finding that workers of a poultry processing plant performed work for which they were not
compensated).
51. See, e.g., Long John Silver's Rests., Inc. v. Cole, 514 F.3d 345, 353-54 (4th Cir. 2008)
(declining to vacate an arbitration award for employees that were not compensated adequately
for overtime work).
52. Cf. Scott A. Moss, Reluctant Judicial Factfinding: When Minimalism and Judicial
Modesty Go Too Far, 32 SEATLE UNIV. L. REV. 549, 563 (2009) ("Andrew Siegel has persuasively
shown that hostility to litigation is the most unifying theme of the Supreme Court's
jurisprudence since the Rehnquist Court era, explaining more of the Court's jurisprudence than
originalism, federalism, or political conservatism . . . ." (citing Andrew M. Siegel, The Court
Against the Courts: Hostility to Litigation as an Organizing Theme in the Rehnquist Court's
Jurisprudence, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1097 (2006))).
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Although a potential outcome of closing the collective action avenue
would be more individual lawsuits, such a result would be unlikely to
occur given that attorneys have negligible incentives to bring
individual wage claims. The result is fewer lawsuits and more wage
violations going unpunished.
There can be no doubt both that there have been an increased
number of wage theft claims and that courts have inconsistently
applied Rule 68 to dispose of many FLSA collective actions. Just as
workers are starting to succeed at vindicating their wage rights with
more successful lawsuits, courts are allowing defendants to use Rule
68 to destroy those lawsuits-something courts have never allowed for
Rule 23 class actions. In this way, courts effectively facilitate wage
theft.
II. THE CONSEQUENCES OF RULE 68 IN REPRESENTATIVE LITIGATION
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68, offers of judgment
may occur at two stages of a lawsuit: before trial begins, and after the
liability portion of the trial has ended. First, at any time more than
fourteen days before a trial begins, a defendant may serve the plaintiff
with an offer to allow judgment to be taken against herself.53 If the
plaintiff accepts the offer by giving written notice within fourteen days
after the service of the offer, either party may then file the offer and
notice of acceptance, together with proof of service thereof, with the
clerk, who shall enter judgment. 54 If the offer is not accepted in this
fashion, or is overtly rejected, the offer is deemed withdrawn, and
evidence of the refusal is inadmissible in court outside of a proceeding
to determine costs.5 5 If the judgment finally obtained by the plaintiff
at trial is not more favorable than the offer, the plaintiff must pay
costs incurred by the defendant after it made the offer.56
Offers of judgment may also occur when the liability portion of
a trial (or the liability trial in a bifurcated proceeding) has ended. If
the amount or extent of the liability still remains to be determined by
future proceedings, the party found liable may make an offer of
judgment. This offer would have the same effect as a pretrial offer,
provided it is served not less than fourteen days prior to the
53. FED. R. CIv. P. 68(a).
54. Id.
55. Id. at 68(b).
56. Id. at 68(d).
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commencement of hearings to determine the amount and extent of
liability.57
The purpose of Rule 68 is to encourage settlements and avoid
protracted litigation.58 By making a Rule 68 offer, the defendant shifts
to the plaintiff the risk of continuing the litigation, as the plaintiff
may be saddled with the defendant's post-offer costs. Although
commentators have suggested a "two way" offer of judgment rule,59 the
current Rule 68 is entirely one sided-only defendants can attempt to
shift this risk. As stated by the Supreme Court in Marek v. Chesny,
the rule "prompts both parties to a suit to evaluate the risks and costs
of litigation, and to balance them against the likelihood of success" at
trial on the merits.60 This incentive might work for individual
litigation-though many have criticized the negative effect of Rule 68
on civil rights litigation, especially after Marek6e-but when offers of
judgment are advanced in collective actions, several problems arise.
57. Id. at 68(c).
58. Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1, 5 (1985).
59. See Harold S. Lewis, Jr. & Thomas A. Eaton, The Contours ofa New FRCP, Rule 68.1: A
Proposed Two-Way Offer of Settlement Provision for Federal Fee-Shifting Cases 19 (Univ. of Ga.
School of Law Research Paper Series, Paper No. 08-012, 2008) ("Rule [68] may induce
compromise even more frequently if the benchmark against which the ultimate trial result is
tested were an average of the counteroffers made by both parties (under a two-way rule), rather
than, as now, against the defendant's offer alone.").
60. Marek, 473 U.S. at 5.
61. Marek involved a wrongful death suit brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by the father of a
man killed by the police. The Court analyzed a rejected offer of judgment after the plaintiff won
at trial but for less than defendant's offer and held that defendants were not liable for attorneys'
fees incurred by plaintiff after officers' pretrial offer of settlement, where plaintiff recovered
judgment less than offer. A sharply divided Court found that "costs" under Rule 68 included
attorneys' fees where the underlying statute permits them as part of costs allowed to a prevailing
party. Marek, 473 U.S. at 7-11. For an analysis of the effects of Rule 68 on civil rights litigation,
see Lesley S. Bonney et al., Rule 68: Awakening a Sleeping Giant, 65 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 379,
403-14 (1997) (discussing the benefits and risks of using Rule 68); Peter Margulies, After Marek,
the Deluge: Harmonizing the Interaction Under Rule 68 of Statutes that Do and Do Not Classify
Attorneys' Fees as "Costs," 73 IOWA L. REV. 413, 427-30 (1988) (explaining some of the negative
effects that Rule 68 has on litigants following Marek, including ex ante conduct uncertainty); Roy
D. Simon, Jr., Rule 68 at the Crossroads: The Relationship Between Offers of Judgment and
Statutory Attorney's Fees, 53 U. CIN. L. REV. 889, 892 (1984) (discussing, prior to the Court's
decision in Marek, how "[i]f the Court decides that Rule 68 in effect incorporates the definition of
costs used in the attorney's fees statute, Rule 68 will become an enormously powerful settlement
tool in cases involving fee-shifting statutes" and noting that "[olne third or more of all federal
litigation will thus be affected by the decision in Marek v. Chesny").
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A. Courts Refuse to Moot Named Plaintiffs' Claims in
Rule 23 Class Actions
1. The Workings of Rule 23
In order to obtain class certification, plaintiffs move for
designation as a class action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.
According to the Supreme Court, a "ruling on the certification issue is
often the most significant decision rendered in . .. [a] class-action
proceeding[]." 62 In moving for class certification, plaintiffs must
establish that they have met all four requirements of Rule 23(a) and
at least one of the requirements of Rule 23(b). 63 Rule 23(a) provides
that class certification is proper only if: "(1) the class is so numerous
that joinder of all members is impracticable; (2) there are questions of
law or fact common to the class; (3) the claims or defenses of the
representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class;
and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect
the interests of the class." 64
After meeting the prerequisites of Rule 23(a), the putative class
must qualify under one of the three subdivisions of Rule 23(b).65
Plaintiffs may opt to use Rule 23(b)(1), under which a class may be
certified where a multitude of individual plaintiffs might create
inconsistent standards or impair the interests of nonparties. 66 A court
may certify a class action under Rule 23(b)(2) if "the party opposing
the class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to
the class," which makes injunctive or declaratory relief applicable to
the entire class.67 Rule 23(b)(3) applies when questions of law or fact
common to the entire class predominate over questions affecting
individual class members and when class resolution provides the
superior method for adjudication.68
62. Deposit Guar. Nat'l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 339 (1980).
63. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)-(b).
64. Id. at 23(a).
65. Id. at 23(b).
66. Id. at 23(b)(1).
67. Id. at 23(b)(2).
68. Id. at 23(b)(3). When making findings regarding the superiority of a class action under
Rule 23(b)(3), the court must consider:
(A) the class members' interests in individually controlling the prosecution or
defense of separate actions; (B) the extent and nature of any litigation
concerning the controversy already begun by or against class members; (C)
the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims





In deciding whether to certify a class, the Supreme Court has
warned courts not to consider the merits of the underlying action.69
Nonetheless, the Court still requires a "rigorous analysis" to
determine if the plaintiffs have proffered evidence to meet each of the
requirements of Rule 23.70 While this has led to some degree of
confusion in the courts over how to analyze class certification
requirements, 71 courts generally agree that they are to be construed
liberally and that a full merits determination is inappropriate. 72
2. The Prohibition of Rule 68 in Class Actions
Both prior to class certification and after a class is certified by
the court, a Rule 23 class will typically be protected against the
possibility of an offer of judgment to the named plaintiffs that aims to
eliminate the entire class's claims.
The Supreme Court has made clear that named plaintiffs are
representatives of the class members' interests. In Deposit Guaranty
National Bank v. Roper, a Rule 23 class action was brought by credit
card holders challenging finance charges applied to their accounts. 73
Following the district court's denial of plaintiffs' motion for class
certification, the defendant bank tendered to each named plaintiff a
Rule 68 "Offer of Defendant to Enter Judgment as by Consent and
Without Waiver of Defenses or Admission of Liability."74 The plaintiffs
rejected the offer.75 Nevertheless, the court entered judgment based
upon the offer and dismissed the action as moot. 76
The Supreme Court, however, reversed.77 According to the
Court, the case was still justiciable because the named plaintiffs
retained an interest in getting the class certified in order to share the
69. See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 178 (1974) ("In determining the
propriety of a class action, the question is not whether the plaintiff or plaintiffs have stated a
cause of action or will prevail on the merits, but rather whether the requirements of Rule 23 are
met." (quoting Miller v. Mackey Int'l, Inc., 452 F.2d 424, 427 (5th Cir. 1971))).
70. Gen. Tel. of the Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 161 (1982).
71. See, e.g., L. Elizabeth Chamblee, Between "Merit Inquiry" and "Rigorous Analysis":
Using Daubert to Navigate the Gray Areas of Federal Class Action Certification, 31 FLA. ST. U. L.
REV. 1041, 1045-50 (2004) (discussing the complexities of determining class certifications).
72. Gunnells v. Healthplan Servs., Inc., 348 F.3d 417, 424 (4th Cir. 2003); Doran v. Mo.
Dep't of Soc. Servs., 251 F.R.D. 401, 404 (W.D. Mo. 2008); In re Control Data Corp. Sec. Litig.,
116 F.R.D. 216, 219 (D. Minn. 1986), rev'd on other grounds, 933 F.2d 616 (8th Cir. 1991).
73. 445 U.S. 326, 327-28 (1980).
74. Id. at 329.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 340.
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expenses of the litigation with other members of the class.78
Furthermore, the Court reasoned that mooting the entire case would
defeat the purpose of class actions and invite waste of judicial
resources.79 The Court readily identified the pragmatic concerns
raised by this litigation tactic, which would "be contrary to sound
judicial administration," "frustrate the objectives of class actions," and
"invite waste of judicial resources by stimulating successive suits
brought by others claiming aggrievement."80
Once a court certifies the class action pursuant to Rule 23, the
named plaintiffs take on a fiduciary role in representing the interests
of the absent class members who are not given the opportunity to
participate meaningfully in the litigation.8' Because of the important
rights being vindicated, courts acknowledge that the named plaintiffs
play a crucial role in bringing justice to those who would otherwise be
hidden from judicial scrutiny.82 By aggregating claims, class actions
provide plaintiffs "the advantage of lower individual costs to vindicate
rights by the pooling of resources" 83 and promote judicial economy
because "[t]he judicial system 'benefits by efficient resolution in one
proceeding of common issues of law and fact arising from the same
alleged discriminatory activity.' "84
By the same process, however, defendants to a Rule 23 class
action face costly and time-consuming litigation.85 To avoid class-wide
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 339; see also Weiss v. Regal Collections, 385 F.3d 337, 344 (3d Cir. 2004)
("[Aillowing the defendants here to 'pick off a representative plaintiff with an offer of judgment
less than two months after the complaint is filed may undercut the viability of the [Rule 23] class
action procedure, and frustrate the objectives of this procedural mechanism .....
81. Deposit Guar. Nat'7 Bank, 445 U.S. at 330.
82. Cf. Ruan, supra note 5, at 408-13 (describing the role of named plaintiffs in
employment discrimination class actions under Rule 23); see also Deposit Guar. Nat'l Bank, 445
U.S. at 338 (discussing importance of named plaintiff); Bowens v. Atl. Maint. Corp., 546 F. Supp.
2d 55, 80 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) (discussing importance of named plaintiff in class action); Morales-
Arcadio v. Shannon Produce Farms, 237 F.R.D. 700, 702 n.2 (S.D. Ga. 2006) (noting that "courts
have been concerned about defendants strategically making offers in an attempt to cut off
litigation before all of the class members have been identified"); Geer v. Challenge Fin. Investors
Corp., No. 05-1109-JTM, 2006 WL 704933, at *3 (D. Kan. Mar. 14, 2006) (denying defendant's
motion to dismiss in order to protect the rights of similarly situated plaintiffs); Villatoro v. Kim
Son Rest., 286 F. Supp. 2d 807, 811 (S.D. Tex. 2003) (discussing the importance of ensuring that
similarly situated individuals are given adequate notice).
83. Hoffmann-LaRoche, Inc. v. Sperling, 493 U.S. 165, 170 (1989).
84. Id.
85. See In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1297 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding that
mandamus appeal from grant of class certification was appropriate because an appeal from the
final judgment "will come too late to provide effective relief for these defendants [due to] the
sheer magnitude of the risk to which the class action, in contrast to the individual actions
pending or likely, exposes them").
[Vol. 63:3:727742
FACILITATING WAGE THEFT
liability, defendants have attempted to invoke Rule 68 offers of
judgment to settle the named plaintiffs' claims in order to moot the
class allegations. Defendants style an offer of judgment to include
damages to the named plaintiffs, ignoring the absent class members'
claims. This litigation strategy is easily identifiable by the courts as a
"thinly-veiled effort[] to 'pick off the putative class representative." 86
These attempts to circumvent the class vehicle and avoid liability from
the absent class members are often rejected by the courts.87
The Supreme Court has further protected class actions from
early dismissal by finding that named plaintiffs' claims cannot be
mooted even if their claim is "so inherently transitory that the trial
court will not have even enough time to rule on a motion for class
certification before the proposed representative's individual interest
expires."88 In County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, the Court recognized
the important policy considerations addressed in Roper and held that
a putative class action may proceed regardless of whether the named
plaintiffs claim has been mooted.89 The plaintiff in Riverside argued
that the County of Riverside should alter its policies for providing
hearings to in-custody arrestees who were arrested without
warrants. 90 Shortly after filing the complaint, the plaintiff filed for
class certification, which was granted. The Court found that
certification of the class provided the unnamed members of the class a
legal status separate from the named plaintiff. Relying upon Sosna v.
Iowa,91 the Court stated that so long as a named plaintiff with the
requisite case or controversy is involved in the suit at the time of
certification, the case is not deemed moot by an offer of judgment.92
To accomplish this, the Court related back the date of the
certification to the date of the filing of the original complaint. This
creates an exception to the traditional mootness doctrine and nullifies
86. McDowall v. Cogan, 216 F.R.D. 46, 51 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) ("[O]ffers of judgment made to
named representatives immediately after putative [Rule 23] class actions are filed often are
thinly-veiled efforts to 'pick off' the putative class representative.").
87. See Yeboah v. Cent. Parking Sys., No. 06 CV 0128(RJD)(JMA), 2007 WL 3232509, at *5
(E.D.N.Y. Nov. 1, 2007) (finding that the presence of even one opt-in plaintiff foreclosed
defendant's argument that plaintiffs FLSA claim had been mooted by the offer of judgment);
Geer, 2006 WL 704933, at *3 ("Although nothing in the rules prevents the parties from engaging
in tactics to moot the case early on, this court is reluctant to allow defendants to bar the
courtroom doors so early in the litigation."); Asch v. Teller, Levit & Silvertrust, P.C., 200 F.R.D.
399, 401 (N.D. Ill. 2000) (describing the misuse of Rule 68 as a "clever device for gaining an
advantage by racing to the courthouse").
88. County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 52 (1991).
89. Id.
90. Id. at 47-48.
91. 419 U.S. 393 (1975).
92. County of Riverside, 500 U.S. at 51-52.
2010] 743
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 63:3:727
the application of Rule 68 in the class action context. Despite being
introduced in a footnote in Sosna, the relation-back doctrine has
reappeared as the central underpinning for decisions holding that full
offers of judgment to plaintiffs do not render class actions moot.93
B. Courts Dismiss Named Plaintiffs' Claims in Collective Actions by
Finding Them Moot after an Offer of Judgment
1. How a Collective Action Is Brought under Section 216(b)
To bring a collective action under § 216(b), plaintiffs must
bring a "timely" motion to determine whether a suit may proceed as a
collective action.94 Courts typically employ a two-step approach in
determining collective action status.95 At the initial notice stage, the
court determines on the basis of pleadings and affidavits whether to
notify potential members of the collective action that the case is
pending. 96 At this stage, plaintiffs must establish the existence of
other employees who are similarly situated to them. 97 Other
employees are similarly situated if they, too, were subjected to the
conduct being challenged by plaintiffs in the litigation.98
At the initial stage, the burden for demonstrating that
plaintiffs and potential plaintiffs are similarly situated is minimal.99
Plaintiffs need to make only a modest factual showing that they and
other employees were victims of "a common policy or plan that
93. See, e.g., Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 111 (1975) ("This case belongs, however, to
that narrow class of cases in which the termination of a class representative's claim does not
moot the claims of the unnamed members of the class."); Weiss v. Regal Collections, 385 F.3d
337, 347 (3d Cir. 2004) (discussing application of the relation-back doctrine); Hennessey v. Conn.
Valley Fitness Ctrs., Inc., No. CV980504488S, 2001 WL 1199840, at *6 (Conn. Super. Ct. Sept.
12, 2001) ("Although one might argue that Sosna contains an implication that the crucial factor
for Article III purposes is the timing of class certification, other cases, applying a 'relation back'
approach, clearly demonstrate that timing is not crucial." (citing U.S. Parole Comm'n v.
Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 398 (1980))).
94. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b).
95. E.g., Cuzco v. Orion Builders, Inc., 477 F. Supp. 2d 628, 632 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) ("Courts
typically undertake a two-stage review in determining whether a suit may proceed as a collective
action under the FLSA."); Sipas v. Sammy's Fishbox, Inc., No. 05 Civ. 10319 (PAC), 2006 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 24318, at *6-7 & n.1 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 24, 2006) (explaining that certification of a class
action requires two steps).
96. Torres v. Gristede's Oper. Corp., No. 04 Civ. 3316 (PAC), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74039,
at *23-24 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2006).
97. Realite v. Ark Rests. Corp., 7 F. Supp. 2d 303, 306 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
98. Gjurovich v. Emmanuel's Marketplace, Inc., 282 F. Supp. 2d 101, 104 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
99. Damassia v. Duane Reade, Inc., No. 04 Civ. 8819 (GEL), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73090,
at *9-10 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 5, 2006).
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violated the law." 00 The court applies " 'a fairly lenient standard' and
(when it does so) typically grants 'conditional certification.' "101 While
full discovery into liability and damages is not required, some
discovery typically must occur. Minimal discovery is needed because
courts rely upon allegations supported by employee declarations or
affidavits, in addition to the complaint to determine whether plaintiffs
and potential opt-ins are similarly situated.102
Because workers must affirmatively opt in by filing a written
consent to participate, allowing plaintiffs conditional certification is
crucial to enabling these workers to vindicate their rights.103 In order
to decide whether to opt in, these workers must be apprised of the
pendency of the case in a timely manner; otherwise, the claims of
many would be barred or diminished by the statutes of limitations of
the FLSA, EPA, or ADEA.104 Without notice, these potential plaintiffs
would be severely prejudiced by being unable to prosecute their rights.
The Supreme Court has recognized this urgency. It has held that
courts have the discretion to manage the notice process to give
prospective class members an early opportunity to join, both because
of the broad remedial goal of the FLSA and because of the "wisdom
and necessity for early judicial intervention." 05
At the second stage, after full liability discovery, courts make a
more searching factual determination as to whether members of the
collective are, in fact, similarly situated.106 This determination
typically occurs following a motion for decertification. If the members
are found not to be similarly situated at that point, the court can
decertify the class. 07
100. Hoffmann v. Sbarro, Inc., 982 F. Supp. 249, 261 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
101. Torres, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74039, at *23.
102. Gjurovich, 282 F. Supp. 2d at 104.
103. See 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) ("No employee shall be a party plaintiff to any such action unless
he gives his consent in writing to become such a party and such consent is filed in the court in
which such action is brought.").
104. See id. (explaining the circumstances in which claims will be terminated); Hoffmann-La
Roche Inc. v. Sperling, 493 U.S. 165, 169 (1989) (stating that the district court found it
permissible for a court to "facilitate notice of an ADEA suit to absent class members in
appropriate circumstances"); Hoffmann, 982 F. Supp. at 260 (discussing that the running of the
statute of limitations motivated plaintiffs request for court- authorized notice informing potential
plaintiffs of the opportunity to opt in).
105. Hoffmann-La Roche Inc., 493 U.S. at 171-73.
106. Torres, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74039, at *37-38; Gjurovich, 282 F. Supp. 2d at 103-04.
107. See, e.g., Smith v. Lowe's Home Ctrs., 236 F.R.D. 354, 357 (S.D. Ohio 2006) ("[Imf the
claimants are not similarly situated, the district court de-certifies the class.").
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2. The Acceptance of Rule 68 in Collective Actions
In contrast to how courts refuse to dismiss Rule 23 actions,
courts readily dismiss § 216(b) collective action cases where a valid
offer of judgment is made to the named plaintiffs.108 Because under §
216(b) no person can become a plaintiff or be bound by the litigation
unless she has affirmatively opted into the action, courts reason that
the named plaintiff has no right to represent similarly situated
people. 109 Therefore, when a defendant makes a valid Rule 68 offer of
judgment that fully addresses the damages of the particular named
plaintiffs, the named plaintiffs no longer have a stake in the action,
and the case is dismissed as moot. 10
One particularly stark example of this trend occurred in Ward
v. Bank of New York, a Southern District of New York decision by
Judge Denny Chin."' A former bank cashier brought overtime pay
claims under the FLSA and New York state law. The defendant bank
made a Rule 68 offer of judgment to the plaintiff for $1,000 plus
reasonable attorneys' fees less than two months after the complaint
was filed and prior to anyone opting in to the case.112 The plaintiff
108. For examples of courts dismissing § 216(b) cases when a valid offer of judgment is made
to named plaintiffs, see Collins v. Sanderson Farms, Inc., 568 F. Supp. 2d 714, 716 (E.D. La.
2008); Louisdor v. Am. Telecomms., Inc., 540 F. Supp. 2d 368, 370 (E.D.N.Y. 2008); Tallon v.
Lloyd & McDaniel, 497 F. Supp. 2d 847, 853-54 (W.D. Ky. 2007); Darboe v. Goodwill Indus. of
Greater N.Y. & N. N.J., Inc., 485 F. Supp. 2d 221, 224 (E.D.N.Y. 2007); Ward v. Bank of N.Y.,
455 F. Supp. 2d 262, 264 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); Briggs v. Arthur T. Mott Real Estate LLC, No. 06-0468
(DRH) (WDW), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82891, at *12 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 2006); Vogel v. Am.
Kiosk Mgmt., 371 F. Supp. 2d 122, 130 (D. Conn. 2005); Taylor v. CompUSA, Inc., No. 1:04-CV-
718-WBH, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14492, at *8 (N.D. Ga. July 14, 2004); Tratt v. Retreival
Masters Creditors Bureau, Inc., No. 00-CV-4560 (ILG), 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22401, at *5-6
(S.D.N.Y. May 23, 2001). For examples of courts denying motions to dismiss in § 216(b) cases, see
Rubery v. Buth-Na-Bodhaige, Inc., 494 F. Supp. 2d 178, 181 (W.D.N.Y. 2007); Roble v. Celestica
Corp., 627 F. Supp. 2d 1008, 1015 (D. Minn. 2007); Yeboah v. Cent. Parking Sys., No. 06 CV 0128
(RJD) (JMA), 2007 WL 3232509, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 1, 2007); Reyes v. Carnival Corp., No. 04-
21861-CIV-GOLD/TURNOFF, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11948, at *28 (S.D. Fla. May 25, 2005).
109. See Cameron-Grant v. Maxim Healthcare Servs., Inc., 347 F.3d 1240, 1249 (11th Cir.
2003) ("Even if the § 216(b) plaintiff can demonstrate that there are other plaintiffs 'similarly
situated' to him, he has no right to represent them."); LaChapelle v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 513
F.2d 286, 287 (5th Cir. 1975) ("The appeal presents for decision a single, well defined question of
law. This is whether suits brought under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967
may be Rule 23-type class actions. We conclude that they may not and, therefore, affirm the
decision below.").
110. See Ward, 455 F. Supp. 2d at 268 (noting that it is "proper to dismiss a complaint for
lack of subject-matter jurisdiction when a plaintiff is offered all that the plaintiff could recover at
trial").
111. Id. at 262.
112. Id. at 265.
746
FACILITATING WAGE THEFT
rejected the defendant's offer, and the defendant promptly filed a
motion to dismiss the plaintiffs claims. 113
In granting the defendant's motion, the court held that the
defendant's offer of judgment rendered the plaintiffs claims moot,
even though the offer was rejected. 14 Because no other employees had
opted in to the case and the defendant's offer exceeded the amount
that the plaintiff could potentially recover if the case went to trial, the
named plaintiff no longer had a stake in the matter, and therefore, his
claims were moot. 115 The court specifically emphasized the fact that no
additional plaintiffs had come forward.116 However, this lack of
plaintiffs should not have been surprising given that the offer came
only weeks after the complaint and before notice had been sent out
informing other workers of the litigation.
The district court, like others that have examined this issue,
acknowledged the plaintiffs policy arguments that a defendant should
not be allowed to pick off a representative-action plaintiff and noted
that these points gave the judge some pause.117 Ultimately, however,
the court held that an early offer of judgment that exceeds the named
plaintiffs' claims results in a dismissed action.
III. RULE 68 REVEALS THE INCONSISTENT JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF
RULE 23 CLASS ACTIONS AND SECTION 216(b) COLLECTIVE ACTIONS
Examining how courts disparately treat offers of judgment in
Rule 23 class actions and in FLSA collective actions reveals the
preferred status given to class over collective actions. This disparate
treatment was not mandated by Congress, as there is no expressed
legislative intent to provide FLSA actions with less power to vindicate
plaintiffs' statutory rights. The § 216(b) opt-in procedure was the
preferred aggregate vehicle in the 1930s, when the FLSA was
enacted. 18 Rule 23 was amended in 1966 by the Advisory Committee
for the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. But only Congress can amend
a statutory provision such as § 216(b), and it has failed to do so. The
congressional failure to amend FLSA statutory rights to authorize the
opt-out class vehicle modernized in the 1960s has had a major, and




115. Id. at 269-70.
116. Id. at 270.
117. Id. at 269.
118. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b).
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Courts give Rule 23 class actions preferred status by not
allowing a Rule 68 offer of judgment to moot the named plaintiffs'
claims in class actions, whereas they increasingly allow such offers to
moot FLSA collective actions. The explanations courts offer for the
disparate outcomes in Rule 68 cases have no basis in the language of
the FLSA. Indeed, dismissal subverts the statutory purpose of
protecting workers from abuses such as wage violations. The inferior
treatment of FLSA collective actions is significant because the
likelihood of recovery of lawful wages diminishes if workers are unable
to aggregate their claims.
Moreover, this inconsistency cannot be explained by structural
distinctions 19 between the aggregation rules. Similarly exacting
safeguards are already in place for both the Rule 23 class and § 216(b)
aggregate vehicles. Currently, courts require both that § 216(b) cases
show exacting evidence that the members of the class are similarly
situated and that they can be "decertified" if they fail to make the
requisite showing of common wage and hour practices and numerous
affected workers. 120
The inconsistency also cannot be explained by differences
among the role of named plaintiffs. Named plaintiffs in both contexts
are required to perform extensive work for the class, and neither
FLSA collective action claims nor Rule 23 class actions can be brought
without their assistance. Additionally, it is unfair to ask FLSA named
plaintiffs to make decisions on offers of judgment given the effect such
offers have on their exposure to defendants' costs.
Lastly, the inconsistency directly contravenes the goal of
judicial oversight of class and collective settlements. Rule 68 works in
both contexts to subvert the goal of having judges make reasoned
decisions on whether settlements are fair and equitable in light of the
facts.
A. Early Dismissal of FLSA Collective Actions Subverts the Statutory
Scheme of Preventing Wage Abuses
As outlined in Part II, courts too often dismiss § 216(b) actions
as moot upon a defendant employer's offer of judgment to named
plaintiffs in wage and hour collective actions. Such determinations are
119. Smith v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 570 F.3d 1119, 1122 (9th Cir. 2009).
120. Morgan v. Family Dollar Stores, Inc., 551 F.3d 1233, 1261-62 (11th Cir. 2008)
("[A]ithough the FLSA does not require potential class members to hold identical positions, the
similarities necessary to maintain a collective action under § 216(b) must extend beyond the




inconsistent with both the statutory intent of the FLSA and the
treatment of Rule 23 class actions.
Dismissing collective actions through the application of Rule 68
thwarts the purpose and intent of the FLSA. The FLSA was enacted to
ensure that every employee receives "a fair day's pay for a fair day's
work." 121 The FLSA requirements that workers be paid a minimum
wage for all hours worked and a premium wage for overtime hours are
necessary tools to ensure that workers earn a living wage. Given the
relatively small amounts of money at issue in an individual case
seeking lawful compensation, Congress included provisions in the
FLSA to encourage litigation, including the § 216(b) collective action
mechanism. Collective actions under the FLSA reflect a policy to
encourage judicial economy by efficiently resolving multiple claims
through one action and providing enough incentive for private
attorneys general to bring the claims to court.122
Picking off named plaintiffs through Rule 68 offers thus
impedes judicial economy and forces multiple individual lawsuits
stemming from the same allegations. Courts should discourage
defendants' attempts to buy off individual claims of named plaintiffs
attempting to represent a class of claimants. 123 The Supreme Court
and other federal courts have explicitly rejected this strategy in the
Rule 23 context because they "encourage a 'race to pay off named
plaintiffs very early in litigation."1 24 "A dismissal for mootness is a tool
to comply with jurisdictional limitations imposed by the Constitution
of the United States and not a ploy for an agile defendant to escape
compliance with the Fair Labor Standards Act."125
The doctrine of mootness requires that the parties maintain a
"legally cognizable interest in the outcome" of the litigation.126 If a
case is rendered moot, the federal courts lack subject-matter
jurisdiction over the matter because they "are without power to decide
121. A.H. Phillips, Inc. v. Walling, 324 U.S. 490, 493 (1945).
122. Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968) (per curiam); see also Holt v.
Rite Aid Corp., 333 F. Supp. 2d 1265, 1269 (M.D. Ala. 2004) (citing Hoffmann-LaRoche, Inc. v.
Sperling, 493 U.S. 165, 170 (1989)).
123. See, e.g., Deposit Guar. Nat'l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 339 (1980) ("To deny the
right to appeal simply because the defendant has sought to 'buy off the individual private claims
of the named plaintiffs would be contrary to sound judicial administration.").
124. Liles v. Am. Corrective Counseling Servs., Inc., 201 F.R.D. 452, 455 (S.D. Iowa 2001).
Rejecting this tactic "restore[s] Rule 68 to the role it should have-a means of facilitating and
encouraging settlements, rather than a clever device for gaining an advantage by racing to the
courthouse." Asch v. Teller, Levit & Silvertrust, P.C., 200 F.R.D. 399, 401 (N.D. Ill. 2000).
125. MacKenzie v. Kindred Hosps. E., L.L.C., 276 F. Supp. 2d 1211, 1213 n.2 (M.D. Fla.
2003).
126. County of L.A. v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625, 631 (1979) (quoting Powell v. McCormack, 395
U.S. 486, 496 (1969)).
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questions that cannot affect the rights of litigants in the case before
them."127 Cases are found to be moot only in certain, well-defined
circumstances: "[A] case becomes moot. . . when it is impossible for
the court to grant any effectual relief whatever to a prevailing
party."128
As an initial matter, courts should deny a motion to dismiss for
mootness unless a pleader fails "to amplify a claim with some factual
allegations in those contexts where such amplification is needed to
render the claim plausible." 129 In the context of collective actions,
because the named plaintiffs targeted by the defendant's offer
represent a class of people who have been similarly harmed, the court
should continue to exercise its remedial powers with regard to the
class and only dismiss a collective action for mootness when the offer
of judgment is for the maximum possible recovery for all potential
plaintiffs. 130
At the very least, courts should defer rulings on offers of
judgment until a reasonable time after initial notice is sent to the
putative class members. Court-sanctioned notice to putative class
members is the first opportunity for workers to learn of an action to
recover lost wages. In order to receive notice, first, courts must make
a determination whether plaintiffs have shown that similarly situated
employees exist. 3 1 This requires substantial discovery on the
parameters of the claims and the class, in order to determine how
many putative employees have been affected and to make an initial
calculation of how much money in wages these putative members are
owed. This discovery requires time and effort by both parties. The
127. North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U.S. 244, 246 (1971).
128. In re Kurtzman, 194 F.3d 54, 58 (2d Cir. 1999) (quoting Capital Commc'ns Fed. Credit
Union v. Boodrow, 126 F.3d 43, 46 (2d Cir. 1997)); see also Cook v. Colgate Univ., 992 F.2d 17, 19
(2d Cir. 1993) (holding that a case becomes moot "when it becomes impossible for the courts,
through the exercise of their remedial powers, to do anything to redress the injury" (quoting
Alexander v. Yale, 631 F.2d 178, 183 (2d Cir. 1980))).
129. Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 157-58 (2d Cir. 2007), rev'd in part on other grounds,
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009) (generally citing Bell Atl. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544
(2007)).
130. When a Rule 68 Offer of Judgment is made to only one of several plaintiffs, the offer will
not moot the collective action. This is true regardless of the number of additional opt-ins. See
Geer v. Challenge Fin. Investors Corp., No. 05-1109-JTM, 2006 WL 704933, at *3 (D. Kan. Mar.
14, 2006) (denying motion to dismiss as offer covered only two of three opt-in plaintiffs and
evidence was insufficient to determine if offer covered all damages); Reyes v. Carnival Corp., No.
04-21861-CIV-GOLD/TURNOFF, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11948, at *8 (S.D. Fla. May 25, 2005)
("[Tiwo other persons ... have opted in to this suit, and [defendant] has not made offers of
judgment to them."); Reed v. TJX Cos., No. 04 C 1247, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21605, at *5 (N.D.
Ill. Oct. 26, 2004) (refusing to dismiss where plaintiff "has identified two similarly situated
individuals who have filed written consents with this court to join this lawsuit").
131. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b).
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defendant employer must identify and provide contact information for
all employees who fit the class description. 132 Then, plaintiffs' counsel
must interview multiple employees to determine both the scope of the
affected class and the amount of damages that these employees
suffered from the alleged unlawful wage practices.
Once the parties have had an opportunity to identify and
collect data on the putative class, the court makes an initial § 216(b)
determination to analyze whether plaintiffs have made the modest
required showing of similarly situated employees that suffered similar
wage violations. 133 If the court determines that plaintiffs have made
such a showing, notice is sent to the putative class members to have
an opportunity to opt in to the law suit. Once the court determines
that potential opt-in plaintiffs are similarly situated for the purposes
of authorizing notice, the court conditionally certifies the collective
action,134 and plaintiffs send court-approved notices to potential class
members. 135 The initial conditional certification determination is
merely a preliminary finding. 136 Upon receiving notice, the potential
plaintiffs may elect to opt in pursuant to § 216(b) by filing written
consents with the court.137
At this point, the identities and names of the class members
are knowable, and an offer of judgment can be made to all of them.138
Courts that moot these claims before the workers have an opportunity
to learn about the action obstruct the statutory intent of protecting
132. See ABA SEC. OF LAB. & EMP. LAW, THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT 1162 (Ellen C.
Kearns et al. eds., 1999) ("In order to enable the joinder of additional employees who might wish
to join in the suit, a plaintiff may seek discovery of the names and addresses of similarly situated
employees and former employees.").
133. Hoffmann v. Sbarro, Inc., 982 F. Supp. 249, 261 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
134. Masson v. Ecolab, Inc., No. 04 Civ. 4488(MBM), 2005 WL 2000133, at *13 (S.D.N.Y.
Aug. 17, 2005) (citing Mooney v. Aramco Servs. Co., 54 F.3d 1207, 1213-14 (5th Cir. 1995)).
135. See Patton v. Thomson Corp., 364 F. Supp. 2d 263, 266 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) ("A court may,
but need not, authorize [opt-in] notification, and direct an employer defendant to disclose the
names and addresses of similarly situated potential plaintiffs." (citing Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc.
v. Sperling, 493 U.S. 165, 169 (1989))).
136. Lee v. ABC Carpet & Home, 236 F.R.D. 193, 197 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); Patton, 364 F. Supp.
2d at 268.
137. Lee, 236 F.R.D. at 197; Masson, 2005 WL 2000133, at *13.
138. Circuit courts generally agree that if a trial court determines that initial certification is
improper because of a lack of showing that similarly situated employees exist, then dismissing
this type of "voluntary" offer of judgment as mooting the named plaintiffs' claims is proper.
Smith v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 570 F.3d 1119, 1121 (9th Cir. 2009); Sandoz v. Cingular Wireless
LLC, 553 F.3d 913, 916 (5th Cir. 2008); Cameron-Grant v. Maxim Healthcare Servs., Inc., 347
F.3d 1240, 1244 (11th Cir. 2003). This analysis is not in conflict with the article's broader
argument. The plaintiffs in these cases had an opportunity to determine and make a showing of
similarly situated employees but failed to make that requisite showing.
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workers from wage violations. 139 Courts should be wary of this
practice because it "defeats the purpose of the collective action
mechanism."140
Courts should more consistently remain "mindful of the
inherent danger that motions to dismiss grounded on a Rule 68 offer
may be wielded as a strategic weapon to frustrate the FLSA's very
object-ensuring that every employee receives 'a fair day's pay for a
fair day's work.' "141 Some courts have successfully navigated this
procedural minefield. For example, in Reed v. The TJX Companies,
Inc., the district court denied a motion to dismiss in a similar
situation.142 The defendant proffered an affidavit from a witness who
had calculated the plaintiffs damages, offered the maximum recovery
under this calculation, and then moved to dismiss on the grounds of
mootness.143 The court rejected the defendant's calculation and denied
the motion.144 The court noted the particular concerns that arise when
defendants attempt to moot collective actions early in the case. 145
Unfortunately, only a minority of courts have chosen to do so.
B. Rule 23 Class and Section 216(b) Collective Procedures Protect
against Similar Abuses
The inconsistent treatment of class and collective actions by
courts is not reasonably explained by the structural differences of Rule
23 and § 216(b). One argument that courts have adopted to support
dismissal of § 216(b) collective actions after offers of judgment is that
the way in which such actions are structured makes them different in
kind from Rule 23 class actions,146 which have more exacting
requirements and consequently are more deserving of protection.
139. See Ward v. Bank of N.Y., 455 F. Supp. 2d 262, 268 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) ("Furthermore,
courts are wary of attempts by defendants to evade FLSA collective actions by making Rule 68
offers of judgment 'at the earliest possible time.' " (quoting Reyes v. Carnival Corp., No. 04-
21861-CIV-GOLD/TURNOFF, 2005 U.S. Dist LEXIS 11948, at *10-11 (S.D. Fla. May 25, 2005))).
140. Reyes, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11948, at *10-11; see also Reed v. TJX Cos., No. 04 C
1247, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21605, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 26, 2004) ("Of particular concern in this
case is the ability of defendant purposefully to moot the class action complaint between the time
of filing and class notification or certification.").
141. Rubery v. Buth-Na-Bodhaige, Inc., 494 F. Supp. 2d 178, 180-81 (W.D.N.Y. 2007)
(quoting A.H. Phillips v. Wailing, 324 U.S. 490, 493 (1945)).
142. Reed, 2004 WL 2415055, at *3.
143. Id. at *1.
144. Id. at *2.
145. Id. at *3.
146. See Davis v. Abercombie & Fitch, No. 08 Civ. 1859 (PKC), 2008 WL 4702840, at *8
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 23, 2008) (noting that class certification under the "similarly situated" standard is
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Rule 23 requirements may at first appear more strenuous in
ensuring that the putative class actually meets the goals of aggregate
litigation. Such an appearance results from the four-step inquiry of
Rule 23-which requires both that the class be sufficiently numerous,
with common issues predominating, and that the case be litigated in
one forum to promote efficiency and consistency.147 The requirements
of § 216(b), however, are streamlined but no less rigorous than the
four-step model used in Rule 23 class actions. Those requirements are
therefore appropriately tied to the goals of class litigation.
As outlined above, the first step under § 216(b) before notice
can be sent is the minimal showing that there are numerous similarly
situated employees. 148 At the second step, typically on a motion for
decertification, the court undertakes a more stringent analysis as to
whether members of the collective are, in fact, similarly situated.149
Courts look to factors similar, if not identical, to the requirements of
Rule 23: whether there are common issues of fact (such as common
policies or practices of wage violations), whether there is sufficient
evidence of a numerous class (through evidence of worker affidavits),
and whether the named plaintiffs have typical claims that fairly
represent the claims of the worker class.150 If, after merits discovery, it
is apparent that the named plaintiffs and the opt-in plaintiffs are not
similarly situated, the court may decertify the collective action and
dismiss the claims of the opt-in plaintiffs without prejudice. 15 1
more liberal than under the requirements of Rule 23) (citing Iglesias-Mendoza v. La Belle Farm,
Inc., 239 F.R.D. 363, 328 (S.D.N.Y. 2007)).
147. Whitten v. ARS Nat'l Servs., No. 00 C 6080, 2001 WL 1143238, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 27,
2001).
148. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b).
149. Morgan v. Family Dollar Stores, Inc., 551 F.3d 1233, 1240 (11th Cir. 2008); Mooney v.
Aramco Serv. Co., 54 F.3d 1207, 1214 (5th Cir. 1995); Lee v. ABC Home & Carpet, 236 F.R.D.
193, 197 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); Patton v. Thomson Corp., 364 F. Supp. 2d 263, 267 (E.D.N.Y. 2005).
150. See, e.g., Thiessen v. GE Capital Corp., 267 F.3d 1095, 1103 (10th Cir. 2001) ("During
this 'second stage' analysis, a court reviews several factors, including '(1) disparate factual and
employment settings of the individual plaintiffs; (2) the various defenses available to defendant
which appear to be individual to each plaintiff; (3) fairness and procedural considerations; and
(4) whether plaintiffs made the filings required by the ADEA before instituting suit.' " (quoting
Bayles v. Am. Med. Response, 950 F. Supp. 1053, 1060-61 (D. Colo. 1996))); Sushan v. Univ. of
Colo., 132 F.R.D. 263, 267 (D. Colo. 1990) (arguing that Rule 23 procedures apply in the 216
context as well); St. Leger v. A.C. Nielsen Co., 123 F.R.D. 567, 569 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (refusing to
certify a class where individual questions of fact predominated over common ones). But see
Grayson v. K Mart Corp., 79 F.3d 1086, 1096 n.12 (11th Cir. 1996) ("[It is clear that the
requirements for pursuing a § 216(b) class action are independent of, and unrelated to, the
requirements for class action under Rule 23.").
151. Lee, 236 F.R.D. at 197; see also Patton, 364 F. Supp. 2d at 268 (discussing ability to
revisit the certification issue if discovery shows that the opt-in plaintiffs are not similarly
situated); Gjurovich v. Emmanuel's Marketplace, Inc., 282 F. Supp. 2d 101, 105 n.1 (S.D.N.Y.
2003) (noting that discovery may lead to decertification down the line); Jackson v. N.Y. Tel. Co.,
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Plaintiffs' initial burden is minimal, in part, because the court's
decision to certify the collective action at the first stage is a
preliminary one that may be modified or reversed at the second
certification stage, once discovery is completed. 152
Accordingly, both aggregation devices allow courts to make a
detailed analysis of whether the putative class meets the goals of
aggregate litigation based on factual findings developed by the parties
through strenuous discovery efforts. Among these goals, the most
critical is that the putative class members meet a commonality
requirement that the workers were subject to common violations of
the law stemming from similar factual backgrounds.153
C. Named Plaintiffs Play a Critical Role in Both Rule 23 and Section
216(b) Litigations
Courts have reasoned that Rule 23 named plaintiffs are
irreconcilably different from § 216(b) named plaintiffs, which allows
them to moot § 216(b) plaintiffs' claims even though they refuse
similarly to moot Rule 23 claims.154 However, in important ways, the
role of named plaintiffs in Rule 23 and § 216(b) actions is substantially
similar and equally important to ensuring that the goals of aggregate
litigation are met.
There are many similarities between named plaintiffs under
Rule 23 and § 216(b). Rule 23 requires that named plaintiffs show that
their claims are typical for their class and that they will "fairly and
adequately protect the interests of the class." 55 Likewise, § 216(b)
requires the court to determine that the named plaintiffs' claims are
similarly situated to numerous other workers subjected to workplace
violations. 56 Additionally, both Rule 23 and § 216(b) require that at
least one named plaintiff participate in any class action.
163 F.R.D. 429, 431 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) ("The inquiry at the inception of the lawsuit is less stringent
than the ultimate determination that the class is properly constituted.").
152. Lee, 236 F.R.D. at 197; Mazur v. Olek Lejbzon & Co., No. 05 Civ. 2194(RMB)DF, 2005
WL 3240472, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 2005); Patton, 364 F. Supp. 2d at 267-68; Gjurovich, 282
F. Supp. 2d at 105; Realite v. ARK Rest., Corp., 7 F. Supp. 2d 303, 308 (S.D.N.Y. May 15, 1998).
153. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (permitting actions by "any one or more employees for and in behalf
of himself or themselves and other employees similarly situated"); FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2)
(requiring that "there are questions of law or fact common to the class").
154. See Cameron-Grant v. Maxim Healthcare Serv., Inc., 347 F.3d 1240, 1249 (11th Cir.
2003) ("Thus, the structure of Rule 23 reflects that the named plaintiff has a claim that 'he is
entitled to represent a class.' " (quoting U.S. Parole Comm'n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 338, 402
(1980))).
155. FED. R. CIv. P. 23(a)(4).
156. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b); see, e.g., Thiessen v. GE Capital Corp., 267 F.3d 1095, 1102-03 (10th
Cir. 2001) (discussing three approaches that courts have used to determine whether plaintiffs
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The role of named plaintiffs under both aggregation devices is
demanding, time intensive, and filled with many personal risks. As
one federal district court noted in Frank v. Eastman Kodak Co., "In
employment litigation, the [named] plaintiff is a former or current
employee of the defendant, and thus, by lending his name to the
litigation, he has, for the benefit of the class as a whole, undertaken
the risk of adverse actions by the employer or co-workers." 15 7 Further,
named plaintiffs do substantially similar work in both types of actions.
Employment discrimination and wage and hour cases are both
typically initiated by an employee who informs an attorney of systemic
abuses by an employer. This begins a long investigation process by the
plaintiffs attorney that can take many months to conclude. During
that time, the employee is an important fact witness, providing crucial
information on the employment practices at issue in discrimination
suits, including decisionmaking, promotion and hiring practices, and
managerial hierarchy. At the request of class counsel, "the employee
submits to numerous and sometimes lengthy interviews in the
investigation stage of the litigation."58
Once litigation begins, named plaintiffs for both Rule 23 and
§ 216(b) cases are intimately involved with the preparation of the case.
They provide input and review drafts of the complaint, respond to
specific and detailed document demands, respond to numerous and
detailed interrogatories, and sit through one or several days of
depositions, following considerable preparation.159
In employment matters, the stakes are high because workplace
status and the ability to earn a living are at issue. The financial and
are "similarly situated" for purposes of § 216(b) (citing Bayles v. Am. Med. Response, 950 F.
Supp. 1053, 1060-61 (D. Colo. 1996))); Sushan v. Univ. of Colo., 132 F.R.D. 263, 265 (D. Colo.
1990) (holding that "the named representative plaintiffs in an ADEA class action must satisfy all
of the requirements of rule 23, insofar as those requirements are consistent with 29 U.S.C.A. §
216(by' (emphasis in original)); St. Leger v. A.C. Nielsen Co., 123 F.R.D. 567, 568-69 (N.D. Ill.
1988) (denying motion for class notice because of a lack of commonality of working hours).
157. Frank v. Eastman Kodak Co., 228 F.R.D. 174, 187 (W.D.N.Y. 2005).
158. Cf. Ruan, supra note 5, at 409 (discussing the investigation process in the context of
employment discrimination class actions).
159. See, e.g., W. Elec. Co. v. Stern, 544 F.2d 1196, 1199 (3d Cir. 1976) (overturning district
court's denial of discovery from named plaintiffs); Carnegie v. Mut. Say. Life Ins. Co., No.
Civ.A.CV-99S3292NE, 2004 WL 3715446, at *24 (N.D. Ala. Nov. 23, 2004) (reciting plaintiffs'
discovery responses); In re S. Ohio Corr. Facility, 175 F.R.D. 270, 275 (S.D. Ohio 1997)
(characterizing incentive awards to class representatives as litigation expenses); Van Vranken v.
Atl. Richfield Co., 901 F. Supp. 294, 299-300 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (awarding class representative
$50,000 in incentive awards); Women's Comm. for Equal Employment Opportunity v. Nat'l
Broad. Co., 76 F.R.D. 173, 182 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (deeming disproportionate damage award to
representative plaintiffs proper); Brenda Berkman et al., Roundtable Discussion: Berkman v.
City of New York, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1355, 1359 (1999) (discussing the time commitment
and personal risk named plaintiffs in gender discrimination class action must undertake).
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personal risks that named plaintiffs bear are also substantial. For a
current employee, risk of retaliation by her employer, including losing
her job or being assigned less favorable tasks and responsibilities, is a
real threat. Also, the named plaintiff can expect to be ostracized by
coworkers and to experience general discomfort at the workplace. This
aspect gains importance when viewed in conjunction with the fact that
most employees spend a significant amount of their waking hours at
work and that our self-respect and self-identify are often tied to our
work. In many industries, former or departing employees find
themselves on a do-not-hire list and find future employment in their
chosen field difficult. "Although not always the result of actionable
retaliation, named plaintiffs looking for work sometimes face
unearned, disparaging references when potential employers check
resumes that are traceable to their legal struggle with a former
employer."160
One important difference is that § 216(b) actions require other
workers affirmatively to opt in to the lawsuit. Courts have relied upon
this difference to argue that Rule 23 named plaintiffs are more critical
to their opt-out cases and therefore should not have their cases
mooted. 161 However, the role of § 216(b) named plaintiffs is equally
important because without their work, initial certification would not
be granted, and the workers would never get notice that their wages
might have been withheld unlawfully. Prior to certifying a collective
action under § 216(b) for notice to be sent to other workers, named
plaintiffs must make an initial showing.162 Named plaintiffs assist
their attorneys by providing names and interviewing workers to
supply the court with supportive declarations or affidavits to reflect
that there are other numerous similarly situated workers to meet that
initial threshold. Without the work of the named plaintiffs, § 216(b)
collective actions would never get off the ground.
160. Cf. Ruan, supra note 5, at 411 (describing the personal risks associated with
employment discrimination class actions that named plaintiffs bear).
161. See U.S. Parole Comm'n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 402 (1980) (recognizing that a
named class plaintiff may have a legally cognizable interest in pursuing class certification
beyond his claim on the merits); Deposit Guar. Nat'l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 334-37 (1980)
(observing that named plaintiffs may continue to have a personal interest in the class
certification question, even after an adverse judgment on the merits); Cameron-Grant v. Maxim
Healthcare Serv., Inc., 347 F.3d 1240, 1245 (11th Cir. 2003) (explaining that a named Rule 23
plaintiff may pursue his special interest in appealing denial of class certification where his
individual claims have become moot).
162. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc. v. Sperling, 493 U.S. 165, 170 (1989); Cryer v. Intersolutions,
Inc., No. 06-2032, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29339, at *5 (D.D.C. Apr. 7, 2007) ("[A] court may
conditionally certify the collective action class early in the litigation upon an initial showing the
members of the class are similarly situated. . . .").
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IV. WHY RULE 68 OFFERS ARE INCONSISTENT WITH CLASS AND
COLLECTION ACTIONS GENERALLY
A. "Gun to the Head"Approach Should Not Be a Judicial Tactic for
Promoting Settlement
The stated purpose of Rule 68 is to promote settlement.163 It
does so by encouraging plaintiffs to accept the offer of judgment,
because to reject it means to risk having to pay the costs the
defendant incurs after the offer. 164 Moreover, if the offer is rejected
and the plaintiff does not win a better judgment than the offer, the
same plaintiff is unable to recover her own post-offer costs even if she
prevails.165
This settlement motive behind Rule 68 is especially insidious in
§ 216(b) collective actions, where an offer of judgment may discourage
named plaintiffs from proceeding with the litigation by creating the
risk of personal financial loss. Named plaintiffs in an FLSA case
retain class counsel with the hope that statutory fees will be imposed
on the employer to pay the attorneys for bringing the case.
Accordingly, named plaintiffs are more willing to provide service to
the unnamed class and be exposed in the workplace because they feel
insulated from having to cover the costs and fees of the litigation. In
essence, the risk is minimal because if the case is ultimately
unsuccessful, named plaintiffs have not risked anything monetarily.166
In contrast, if a Rule 68 offer is made the named plaintiffs
risks become sizeable. The named plaintiff then risks having to pay
the defendant's costs (which can be quite substantial) if the ultimate
judgment is less than the offer. The Supreme Court specifically
approved the use of Rule 68 to create financial exposure on the part of
a non-settling plaintiff: "To be sure, application of Rule 68 will require
plaintiffs to 'think very hard' about whether continued litigation is
worthwhile . . . ."167
But in the § 216(b) context, this puts the named plaintiff
between the proverbial rock and a hard place: Suffer the financial
163. Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1, 6 (1985).
164. FED. R. CIV. P. 68(d); Ian H. Fisher, Federal Rule 68, A Defendant's Subtle Weapon: Its
Use and Pitfalls, 14 DEPAUL BUS. L.J. 89, 91 (2001).
165. FED. R. CIV. P. 68(d); see Marek, 473 U.S. at 6 ("[T]he offer [must] be one that allows
judgment to be taken against the defendant for both the damages caused by the challenged
conduct and the costs then accrued.").
166. However, the personal risks are still quite high. See supra Part II.C (discussing
personal risks that the named plaintiff bears).
167. Marek, 473 U.S. at 11.
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risks of rejecting the offer and possibly having the court deem the
claim to be moot, or accept the "tactical trick bag"168 and allow
defendant employers to "short-circuit"1 69 a collective action that is the
only hope of fighting against systemic violations in the workplace.
B. Offers of Judgment in Class Litigation Violate Judicial Oversight of
Settlement
To address the fear of collusion between parties in class action
settlements, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were recently
amended to provide more judicial oversight over the settlement of
class actions.170 Rule 23(e)(2) now requires that a proposed class
settlement be approved by the court, which will determine if the
proposed settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate.' 7 ' Courts make
this determination by conducting a "thorough analysis of both
procedural fairness and substantive fairness."172
Judicial oversight of settlements is likewise critical to FLSA
collective actions. Judges take an active role in determining whether
the settlement is reasonable in light of the claims being made. They do
this by examining extensive preliminary and final approval briefing
from the parties and by conducting a fairness hearing to consider any
objections to the settlement.173
In both instances, judicial oversight of settlements ensures that
courts are guardians, or gatekeepers, to protect the mostly absent
class members.174 In evaluating procedural fairness, courts consider
"whether the negotiations were a result of 'arm's length negotiations'
and whether plaintiffs' counsel possessed the experience and ability to
168. Gibson v. Aman Collection Serv., Inc., No. IP 00-1798-CT/G, 2001 WL 849525, at *2
(S.D. Ind. May 21, 2001).
169. Kremnitzer v. Cabrera & Rephen, P.C., 202 F.R.D. 239, 243 (N.D. Ill. 2001).
170. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c) advisory committee's note, 1966 amends. ("Active judicial
supervision may be required to achieve the most effective balance that expedites an informed
certification determination without forcing an artificial and ultimately wasteful division between
certification discovery' and 'merits discovery.' ").
171. FED R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Visa U.S.A. Inc., 396 F.3d 96, 116 (2d
Cir. 2005); Joel A. v. Giuliani, 218 F.3d 132, 138-39 (2d Cir. 2000); see also 2 ALBA CONTE &
HERBERT B. NEWBERG, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 11.43 (4th ed. 2002) (listing factors to
determine whether a settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate); MANUAL FOR COMPLEX
LITIGATION (FOURTH) §§ 21.61 to 21.62 (2004) (discussing the "fair, reasonable, and adequate"
standard).
172. In re Auction Houses Antitrust Litig., 42 Fed. Appx. 511, 520 (2d Cir. 2002).
173. Because FLSA 216(b) actions are often brought with Rule 23 state wage and hour
actions, settlement approval by the court is often merged under these two doctrines.
174. Weinberger v. Kendrick, 698 F.2d 61, 69 n.10 (2d Cir. 1982).
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represent effectively the class's interests."175 If the court makes a
favorable determination on these queries, it will approve the
settlement only after extensive briefing and factual showing by the
parties.
By contrast, Rule 68 operates automatically. It strips the court
of its gatekeeping function to oversee settlements that affect multiple
claimants. It requires no showing that the offer is reasonable in light
of the facts of the litigation. In aggregate litigation, where the offer of
judgment could be made to multiple plaintiffs simultaneously, Rule 68
is in direct contravention to this important judicial role.
CONCLUSION
Using procedural bars to combat an influx of cases protecting
substantive rights is nothing new. However, the inconsistency with
which some rules are applied, as well as the failure to protect an
underprivileged group the laws are explicitly designed to protect, is
striking. By most accounts, the civil rights movement of the 1960s was
successful in spearheading an effort to address discriminatory
practices against racial minorities through substantive statutory
rights (e.g., Title VII) and procedural mechanisms (e.g., Rule 23) by
which those rights could be more easily and appropriately vindicated
through access to the courts.
In contrast, the right of low-wage workers to receive what they
lawfully earn has a longstanding statutory remedy (i.e., the FLSA) but
an antiquated procedural mechanism (i.e., § 216(b)). This disconnect
both diminishes the law's ability to fully vindicate workers' rights and
can be the structural difference that allows other procedural rules
(i.e., Rule 68) to deny standing in federal court at the outset. Word of
this judicial tactic has spread. Indeed, a recent bar association article
geared towards management attorneys proclaimed: "Use the [Rule 68]
offer early and often."176
With regard to allowing Rule 68 offers to moot named
plaintiffs' claims, the solution is squarely within the power of the
judiciary: Deny these attempts to evade wage litigation as inconsistent
with established Rule 23 law and with the legislative intent of the
wage laws.
175. D'Amato v. Deutsche Bank, 236 F.3d 78, 85 (2d Cir. 2001) (citing In re Austrian &
German Bank Holocaust Litig., 80 F. Supp. 2d 164, 173-74 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)).
176. Teresa Rider Bult, Practical Use and Risky Consequences of Rule 68 Offers of Judgment,
33 LITIGATION, Spring 2007, at 26, 27.
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The courts are not the only hope, however. Congress holds the
power to update the FLSA by explicitly authorizing the opt-out class
action mechanism. By allowing opt-out class actions, Congress will
make clear that systemic wage theft deserves a collective remedy
comparable to class actions challenging race and sex discrimination.
Given the recently renewed federal commitment to workers' rights-
as seen through the Americans with Disabilities Amendments Act, the
Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act, and other labor and employment
legislation-perhaps the time is ripe for such action. In the meantime,
courts should apply Rule 68 offers of judgment to § 216(b) collective
actions in a manner consistent with how they apply them to Rule 23
class actions. No longer allowing Rule 68 to preempt collective actions
would end the judicial facilitation of wage theft.
